Abstract--China has been alarmed by its rapid rise in health care expenditures of social health insurance schemes. The health care expenditure per person for the 155 million people covered by the Chinese social insurance plans has been rising at an accelerative rate. We analyze why health care cost in China has risen, and show how other nations may benefit from this experience.
The total cost of social health insurance (SHI) in the People's Republic of China has risen rapidly since its market oriented economic reform beginning in 1978. The rate of increase particularly accelerated since 1985. The government first used demand strategy by instituting coinsurance to contain cost escalation. But it failed. Then the government altered the policy on hospital financing and pricing policies for new technology and drugs. The cost inflation accelerated. We analyze the Chinese experience to show what lessons could be learned. This paper is organized as follows: the first section gives a brief introduction to China's social health insurance schemes; the second section describes the pattern of cost increase of the SHI; section III dissect the cost inflation into various components to isolate the causes for the increases; and the last section provides conclusions and lessons.
CHINA'S SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE
There are two schemes of Social Health Insurance in the People's Republic of China: Government Employee Health Insurance (GHI) and Labor Health Insurance (LHI). The GHI, financed from general revenues, was introduced in 1952. It covers government employees, college teachers and students. The beneficiaries can receive largely free outpatient and inpatient health services. In 1989, 26.5 million people, 2.4% of the population, were covered by the GHI [1, 2] . Health services are mainly provided by public hospitals, but larger organizations with about more than 200 employees usually set up their own clinics. The beneficiaries of GHI are required to seek health services at appointed hospitals of the organization, and the charge for the services will be reimbursed by the GHI based on the government set fee schedule.
Workers employed in the enterprises are insured by the LHI, which was introduced in 1951. It mandates that the state enterprises with more than 100 employees must provide the LHI [3] . Others, including smaller state enterprises, urban and rural collective industries, can voluntarily provide LHI for their employees. Unlike GHI, LHI covers workers' dependants and they are entitled to be reimbursed for 50% of their health expenses. The total number covered by the LHI in 1989 was about 127 million (not including dependants) which accounts for 10.6% of China's population [1, [4] [5] [6] . The benefit of this scheme is the same as the GHI. The LHI is organized and financed by individual enterprises and no risk pooling between enterprises. Most large enterprises with more than 1000 employees, organize their own hospitals (inside hospitals) and most medium size enterprises (200-1000 employees) have their own clinics (inside Years  GNP  budget  of SHI  1952  186  270  1978  358,800  2242  3160  1979  399,800  2602  3160  1980  447,000  3016  4150  1981  477,300  3274  4410  1982  519,300  3766  5050  1983  580,900  4195  5830  1984  696,200  4815  6680  1985  858,800  5481  7810  1986  969,600  6428  10,270  1987  1,130,100  6405  13,100  1988  1,401,800  7305  18,210  1989 1,591,630 7440 22,440 Sources: Refs [7, 20] .
clinics) for providing free outpatient services to their employees. Usually, the inpatient services for medium size enterprises and all health services for small enterprises are provided by hospitals (outside hospitals) contracted by the enterprise and the charges are reimbursed by the enterprises according to the fees set by the government.
THE PATTERN OF COST INCREASE
To analyze the cost escalation, we use data from 1952 to 1989 and divide the years into three periods. The first period is from 1952 till 1978 when Chinese economy and the health care sector were centrally planned and managed.
The second period (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) was characterized by market-oriented economic reform. The third period, 1985 to 1989, marked by rapid inflation.
The cost of SHI has been increasing with an accelerating speed since the start of the GHI and LHI. The national expenditure of SHI increased from 270 million yuan in 1952 to 22,440 million yuan in 1989, an average annual rate of increase 12.7%. Table 1 shows the GNP, health budget of the government and expenditure on the SHI from 1952 to 1989. During the first period, the annual rate of increase in total expenditure for SHI was 9.9%; however, in the second and the third period, the rates of increase were 13.8 and 30.2%, respectively. In the second period (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , the annual rates of increase in GNP, health budget and the SHI expenditure in the second period were similar, 13.2, 13.6 and 13.8% respectively. However, in the third period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , the annual rate of increase in the total SHI expenditure (30.2%) was almost 4 times as that of health budget (7.9%) and 2 times as that of GNP (16.8%).
THE COMPONENTS OF COST ESCALATION
Confronting the trend of cost escalation, China began to reform the SHI in early 1980s. The first cost control measures focused on controlling demand by requiring patients to pay a portion of the cost at the point of service (co-payment). Unfortunately, while the co-payment policy spread all over the country, the cost of SHI increased even more sharply by 1985. This phenomena casted doubts on the effectiveness of the demand strategy to contain costs. Policy makers began to ask for more thoughtful questions such as what factors would explain the cost increase. Some factors determining the cost increase were briefly mentioned in the Chinese publications [8, 14] , but their effects were not quantified. We divide these factors into four categories: increase in the number of covered people; inflation factor which includes the inflation in input factor price and in fee schedules; the aging of the covered population; residual factors such as increase in demand, use of new technology and drugs, and improvement in general quality of services. This paper decomposes the cost increase into these components.
Number of beneficiaries
Expanding enrollment is one reason for the cost increase. Table 2 shows that: (1) while total expenditures increased from 270 million yuan in 1952 to 22,440 million in 1989, the covered population increased from 15 million to 153.73 million in the same period. Although the number of covered population does not include the number of dependants, the effect of the increase in the number of beneficiaries can not be mis-estimated because the average number of dependants for each insuree remains unchanged; (2) by separating out the effect of increased enrollment on expenditures, we see that percentage of total increase that can be explained by the increase in the number of beneficiaries is about 68.7% in period one, 40.3% in period two and only 19.2% in period three. 
Inflation
The inflation has largely resulted from the impact of economic reforms in the country. The implementation of the Responsibility System and the breakdown of the 'Big Pot Policy' introduced competition and market mechanisms into the Chinese economy. Because the reform brought new investments and created new demand, the market prices of many commodities increased. From 1978 to 1985, the general retail price of commodities increased by 25.7%, averaging 3.3% annually [18] . The health sector was greatly impacted by the changing economic environment. The input prices of health services increased.
The increase in input prices affect the cost of SHI in two ways. First, for "inside' hospitals (i.e. those owned by SHI), input factor prices are used to ascertain cost increases. Second, for 'outside' hospitals (those not owned by SHI), the government sets the health service prices. The government raises health service prices to reflect increases in input prices.
Before 1980, the Chinese government controlled the price of health service at a level below the cost. The deficit of health service providers was covered by the government. Due to an increase in input prices, the deficit climbed. Instead of subsidizing more, the government decided to increase the level of regulated prices for health services. In December 1981, the State Council of China approved 'The Report on the Solution to Hospital Loss' prepared by the Ministry of Public Health. The main recommendation of the report was to increase the prices of medical services to match the cost in order to make hospitals breakeven. Thus, both the input price and health service price have been increasing remarkably since the beginning of 1980s.
In the second period, the prices of medical material and equipment increased by 55.7%, averaging 6.5% yearly [19] ; the average cost of labor in the health sector increased by 96.2% in the same period [20] , and the annual rate of increase was 10.1%. It is also estimated that, in the four years following 1981, the prices of health services increased about 27% [21] . Because the service prices were almost stable between 1978 and 1985, we approximate the annual rate of increase for 1978 to 1985 is 3.5%. In the third period, the prices of material and equipment increased 19.5% annually [21] : the price of labor, measured by the annual salary per year per person, increased 14.9% annually; the annual increase of health service price in this period is averaged 13% [20] .
Estimates of the drug prices vary widely. A survey done by the Ministry of Public Health showed that drug prices increased at an annual rate of 14.9% from 1979 to 1989 [22] , yet other official data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics showed that the annual increase between 1978 and 1989 was only 6.6% [23] . Other published data were between this range [12, 24, 25] . The authors of this paper believe that neither of the two extreme numbers is reliable. A more realistic figure should be near the middle of the range, at 9-11% per year. This number is very close to the statistics on the annual increase in prices of Chinese herbal drugs [20] . The figures shows that the annual increase in herbal drugs was 9.5% from 1978 to 1989. For the second period the annual increase was 6%, and 15.5% for the third period. Here we use these medium number as the increase in drug prices instead using the extreme numbers, in order to make our estimation more reliable.
Cost proportions of service input differ. According to several reports [25] [26] [27] , drug costs account for 60% of the total cost, while the salary outlay represents only 16%; and material and equipment make up 24%. Before estimating the net effect of inflation on the cost increase of SHI, we also need to know the percent of services rendered by inside and outside facilities. The author roughly estimated that ~ of the services were provided by the inside facilities with the outside facilities providing the rest (officials of the Chinese Ministry of Public Health stated this estimation was reasonable).
On the basis of the previous discussion, the following mathematical model for estimating the net effect of inflation on the cost increase of the SHI can be constructed:
where E is the annual rate of increase of SHI costs which can be explained by inflation; n is the total number of categories of production factors; IP~ is the annual increase rate of the price of the ith category of production factors; IV,. refers to the percentage of the cost of the ith category of production factors out of the total service cost; SP is the annual increase in the health service price; DP is the annual increase in drug price; W~ refers to the percent of service provided by inside facilities; Wb refers to the percent of services provided by outside facilities; W x is the percent of charges on services by outside facilities; and Wy is the percent of charges for drug by outside facilities. There are two parts on the right side of the equation. The first part is the net effect of the input price on the annual increase in SHI cost of inside facilities. The second part is the net effect of the annual increase of health service prices of the outside facilities. According to the available data mentioned previously, we can list the values of the parameters in Table 3 . Using the mathematical model, it can be calculated that E is equal to 5.6% in period two and 15.1% in period three. It means that of the annual increase in the total SHI cost in period two, 5.6% was caused by the increase in input price and service price which could explain 40.7% of the total annual increase (13.7%), and that of the annual increase in the total SHI in period three, 15.1% was caused by the inflation of input price and service price which could explain 50.1% of the total annual increase (30.2%).
Since most of the parameters for period one were not available, the inflation effects between 1952 to 1978 can not be estimated with the mathematical model above. Instead, we put average inflation rate of general retail prices (0.55%) as rough estimation of the increase in input prices of health care. If the increase in the cost of SHI is equivalent to the increase in input prices of health care, then, 0.55% out of 9.9% annual increase in the cost of SHI in period one was due to inflation which could explain 5.6% of the total increase.
Aging to the beneficiaries
Aging of the covered population was one of the factors that drove the cost of SHI up. In order to decompose the effect of aging from the total increase, the following method is used. Firstly, the per capita expenditure of SHI by age groups in given year is estimated by multiplying the expenditure per unit of services by the utilization rates; secondly, the relative value indexes of expenditure of each age group are constructed by taking the expenditure of the first age group as I. Thirdly, the relative indexes are then weighted by the proportion of beneficiaries of each age group. Finally, the summarized weighted index, which is the indicator of relative level of expenditure, is calculated by adding up the weighted indexes of all age groups. The underlying assumptions of this method are that the per captia expenditure of SHI of every age group may change over time, but the relative value indexes of expenditure are stable; that the change of weighted index in each age group is resulted from the change of proportion of population in that group; and that the change of the summarized weighted index is caused by the change of age distribution of the covered population. Thus, the difference of summarized weighted indexes between years are aging effects on the cost of SHI. Table 4 shows the estimation of the index of health care expenditure of SHI by age. The data of this table are from several sources [28] [29] [30] . Because utilization data by age for the beneficiaries of SHI are not available, we use the national urban data collected by the Ministry of Public Health in 1986 as a substitution. This data should approximate national averages since most of the covered people are located in urban areas. The expenditure per unit of services are from two studies conducted in Beijing and Shanghai between 1989 and 1990. Since the original number of age groups is less than that of Table 4 , we have to extend the expenditures per unit of services into present age groups by shifting the number as an average. For example, the original data stated that for the age group 20-39 the expenditure per hospital day was 29.19 yuan. We use this number to approximate two age groups (20-29 and 30-39) in Table 4 . Table 5 is the age distribution of urban population and the weighted index of health care expenditure of SHI in selected years. Since the age distribution of the urban population in 1952 is not available, the census data of whole population of 1953 is used instead [31] . We feel this will not introduce much error since the birth rates were flat in 1950s, and the age distribution of the population between urban and rural area were almost the same. The population data of other years are from the sampling statistics of urban population [32] [33] [34] . The weighted indexes in Table 5 are calculated by multiplying the indices in Table 4 by population proportions in Table 5 . For example: the health expenditure index for age 10-19 in Table 4 is 0.30; the proportion of this group of population was 18.60% of the total population in 1952; the product of these two figures is 5.58, the weighted index for age group 10-19 of year 1952 in Table 5 . The bottom of Table 5 shows the summarized weighted indices in selected years. In the first period the aging effect explained only 1.5% of the total increase in the cost of SHI. In the following two periods it explained 4.5 and 6.4%, respectively.
The residual J~tctors
Quantifying the effect of residual factors is straightforward. It equals to the total increase minus the sum of increases due to enrollment, inflation and aging. The effect of residual factors in period one is about 3%. Of the annual rate of increases in period two (13.7%), 2% is the effect of residual factors which can explain 14.5% of the cost increase. Of the annual rate of increase in period three (30.2%), 7.4% belongs to the effect of residual factors which can explain 24.3% of the increase in total cost.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The cost of Chinese SHI has increased since the establishment of the programs. Remarkable increases started with the socialist market economic reform of the late 1970s. In an effort to contain these costs, the co-payment policy was introduced in early 1980s and implemented in most cities after the mid 1980s, but cost continued to escalate especially after 1985. Table 6 summarizes the effects of the components on cost escalation of the SHI. It can be seen from the table that:
(1) although the annual rate of increase was 9.9% in period one, the per capita increase was only 3.1%; (2) in period two the per capita expenditure rose by 8.2% per year. The major difference was that during the second period the inflation rate was much higher; (3) the main reasons for the surprising increase in the cost of SHI in period three were higher inflation rates and the increase in the effect of residual factors.
These two categories of factors can explain 74% of the increase in period three with inflation explaining 50% and residual factors 24%. The results of this analysis show that the cost escalation of SHI was predominantly caused by uncontrollable factors. First, along with the process of urbanization and industrialization, the number of beneficiaries increased. The increase in the number of beneficiaries, then, drove the cost of SHI to increase gradually at about 6% per year from 1952 to 1989. This increase resulted from expansion of welfare to the people, not wasted resources. Second, the fact that people are living longer due to improved health status leads to the increase in chronic disease and a subsequent increase in health care costs. The cost increase caused by aging was inevitable and uncontrollable. Third, the increase in input prices and health service prices was due to the inflation of the Chinese economy which was beyond the control of health sector.
To control the increase in the residual factor, China initiated a co-payment policy beginning in the early 1980s. The co-payment policies were differed by organization and enterprise. Generally, the co-payment rate was 10-30% for the out-patient services and 0-10% for inpatient services [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] . In addition there was a higher out-of-pocket registration fee.
One of the interesting findings is that while the co-payment policy was widely adopted to reduce patients' demand in period three, the residual factors rose to 7.4% per year which was much higher than that of first period (2.4%) and second period (2%). This means that the principal factors in the residual are not those related to patients' demand. Although we are not able to quantify the effect of each residual factor, it is clear that the increase in the residual factor increase is mainly due to supply side reasons such as the adoption of new technology and induced demand.
Providers in China had financial incentives to provide more services, prescribe more drugs and use costly technologies under the current hospital financing system. Beginning at the early 1980s, China's hospital sector introduced the Responsibility System which was to give bonuses to health personnel whose work reached or exceeded the quantity standards. Under this system, the amount of bonus the doctor received depended upon the revenue she or he generated for the hospital. Meanwhile, hospital financing was altered. Instead of fully funding the deficit incurred by hospitals, the government gave a fixed budget subsidy to each hospital and hospitals have to assume the responsibility of any losses. The hospital charges for the services rendered were based on fee-for-service. In order to improve their revenue income hospitals had to raise income. But the charges (prices) were regulated. Hospitals can only increase their net revenue by increasing the quantity of profitable services.
The pricing of hospital services has created distortions in the mix of services provided. The regulated prices of modern technology services, like CT scans, MRI and ultrasound, are higher than their costs. There was an incentive for hospitals to use the high tech equipment frequently, especially for those insured patients who bear none of the cost of these procedures. Case studies of many of these services (for example, electroencephalography, coronary care, CT scans, ultrasound and renal dialysis) reveal strong financial incentives for their provision [40] .
Another category of hospital prices is drugs. Hospitals were allowed to mark up the price of drugs by 15% (for Western drugs) to 25% (for Chinese traditional drugs). While the mark up is to cover the cost of storage and distribution, there is also a profit margin. Hence, hospitals have a clear incentive to over-prescribe. This is why drug costs accounted for 60% of the hospital cost and generated a major share of hospital revenue [25] [26] [27] .
Another incentive was created by the two-price system which allowed hospitals to charge a higher price to the insured than the uninsured. Under this price system, a hospital had an incentive to provide more services to the insured. Several studies show that the average length of stay of the insured was as 1.6 times as that of the uninsured; expenditures on drugs for the insured were as much as 3.5 times that of the uninsured [26, 27, 41] .
The financial incentive for hospital over-provision to the beneficiaries of SHI might be a major factor to explain the rapid increase in residual effect in period three. The reason why China failed to control the increase in the residual factor was the supply side responses, such as the changes in hospital behavior due to the reform of hospital financing. While the co-payment strategy may reduce unnecessary demand, the providers may induce demand by providing unnecessary services. Thus, the effect of co-payment can be offset by the change of providers' behavior.
China's experiences in cost escalation of SHI provide other nations with at least two lessons. Firstly, the cost for social health insurance scheme will inevitably increase if the cost increase is predominantly determined by relatively uncontrollable factors such as inflation, aging of the covered population and increased enrollment. Secondly, to contain costs, policy makers need to work on both the demand side and the supply side. Without the strategies to deal with the providers' behavior, such as a prospective reimbursement system, co-payment itself can do little for cost containment.
